Was the Venezuela Operation legal? Executive Power and the Constitutional balance.
By: Anthony Morales
In January 2026, the United States of America conducted a military operation, Operation Absolute Resolve, that resulted in the capture of President Nicolas Maduro. The public reaction was immediate and divided. The more interesting question, however, is not whether the operation was moral or popular, but whether it was legal.
Any answer must begin with the constitutional foundations that America was founded on, and what the framers of that system envisioned. Having rebelled against a monarch who could wage war without the consent of the governed, they deliberately divided war powers. Article I of the US Constitution grants Congress the authority to declare war, raise and fund armies, and oversee military expenditures. Article II powers designate the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. This structure was intentional but also created a modern tension between executive action and legislative deliberation.
The Founders did not expect this tension to be resolved by politicians or self-interested executives as they understood that war was one of the gravest threats to liberty. War would be used to justify centralized executive authority, limit accountability, and habituate emergency governance. That is why, brilliantly, the founders formed Congress in a way of being deliberative that would act as a check to fast-pace executive authority. Through declarations, appropriations, legislative deliberations, and public hearings, the executive power would be hindered in the face of the bicameral body.
What the constitution does not do is specify every circumstance force may or may not be used. It does not define “war”, nor does it explicitly prohibit military actions without formal declarations. The Founders assumed that ambition would counteract ambition, and that institutional checks would enforce restraint. But the founders could not have anticipated the modern, globalized scale, speed and projection of American military power.
As a result, American war powers law has evolved not only through policy but also through formal practice. Over time, legality has come to depend less on congressional formal declarations and more on whether executive action is consistent with precedent and whether Congress chooses to check it.
Following years of informal military actions in Korea and Vietnam, Congress sought to address executive military action with the passing of the War Powers Resolution. The primary provisions attempted to constrain executive authority, while the statute acknowledges that the President can undertake limited military action without congressional approval. The resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours and mandates withdrawal within 60 days absent authorization, with a limited extension for disengagement. Seperately, Congress has at times relied on Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs), most notably in 2001.
Historical precedent reinforces the structure formed especially after WW2 as the US took a global military position as the “leader of the free world”. The US has repeatedly used military force without formal declarations of war, including Panama, Libya, Syria and numerous other operations. The 1989 capture of Panamanian Dictator Manuel Noriega is particularly instructive. Like the Maduro operation, it involved the removal of a foreign leader through military force, followed by criminal prosecution by the DOJ. Congress did not authorize the action in advice but also did not enact legislation to reverse or prohibit it.
Within this framework, the capture of a foreign leader has long been treated as a military objective rather than a law-enforcement action. Whether such an individual is later tried in court does not alter the initial character of the operation. What determines the legality under US code is not who the target is, but the scope, duration and subsequent congressional response.
The Venezuela question does not present a clear departure from precedent and established practice. There was no standing authorization for the use of military force specific to Venezuela, but modern precedent tells us it is not required for limited operations. The decisive factor is not the President’s initiative, but whether Congress chooses to assert Article I authority in response.
None of this answers whether the operation was prudent, stabilizing or consistent with broader foreign policy. Those are political questions, not legal ones. From the standpoint of law, the action aligns with the trajectory of modern war-powers practice, one increasingly defined by executive initiative and legislative inaction.
The Founders designed a system that relied not only on legal boundaries, but on institutional vigilance. Within existing precedent, Operation Absolute Resolve fits within the modern framework of executive-initiated, limited action that remains lawful absent of congressional action.
References:
H.J.Res.542 - 93rd Congress (1973-1974): War Powers Resolution | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
U.S. Constitution | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress